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ABSTRACT 
Hybrid warfare is a recently formed concept that focuses on the complexity of modern 
conflicts and those in the future. After the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean 
Peninsula in 2014, US and Western analysts started using the term hybrid warfare to 
describe Moscow’s strategy.  Analysts and policymakers are starting to consider the 
approach and direction in Ukraine to be a new and unique type of warfare. This study 
discusses the usefulness of the term hybrid warfare and examines two case studies that 
reflect the characteristics of hybrid war, the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, to determine 
if hybrid warfare is indeed unique to the post-9/11 security environment. Both case 
studies have elements of hybrid warfare and involve complex military operations. Hybrid 
threats are not new, and it is important that policymakers are aware of the ongoing 
debates about the usefulness of the hybrid war concept before forming policies to counter 
them. Ultimately, hybrid war as a concept has limited use to the policymaker, but it does 
highlight the growing complexity of modern conflicts. The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine 
involve an increasing blend of unconventional and conventional strategies and tactics. In 
the future, the US will likely fight opponents that utilize a number of political, economic, 
and cyber capabilities that the US has not had to face in previous conflicts.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Hybrid warfare” and “hybrid challenges” are recently formed concepts used to 
describe the characteristics of warfare in the current, post-9/11 geopolitical environment.  
At the end of the Cold War, various academics and military organizations created 
theories to understand and describe on-going conflicts and those that the US could be 
expected to face in the future. Hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, compound warfare, 
Fourth Generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, and low-intensity conflict are different 
terms used to describe the conflicts that the US is currently engaged in, or are likely to 
experience in the future. Many of these concepts were developed after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the US and reflected the experiences of Western countries in the 
War on Terror. 
The concept of “hybrid warfare” was first defined by Frank Hoffman, a Research 
Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) at the Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command. Hoffman described hybrid wars in his 2007 
paper “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” as wars that “incorporate 
a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular 
tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and 
criminal disorder.”1 According to Hoffman’s research, “hybrid wars” had the unique 
characteristic of blurring the lines between different modes of war. Recent conflicts do 
not replace or disregard previously established views on war, but do present new 
challenges that US defense planning must address.  
                                                 
1
Frank Hoffman, “Conflict of the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Potomac Institute for 
Research Studies, (Arlington, VA, 2007), 14.  
 2 
Since Hoffman’s article, hybrid warfare has become part of the common 
vernacular of the US Department of Defense. Other analysts, such as Nathan Freier, John 
McCuen, Helmut Habermayer, and Christopher Bowers, have devoted academic research 
to defining hybrid warfare and its effect on US strategic thinking.  
US national security policy has already recognized that hybrid wars are a 
challenge that needs to be addressed. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
government officials in the US and NATO have used hybrid war and its various forms to 
describe Russia’s strategy in the region. During a speech in Berlin in July 2015, US 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter asked his audience, “How do we confront cyber-
attacks, propaganda campaigns and hybrid warfare?”  The term was also featured in the 
2015 US Nation Military Strategy, as well as a 2015 NATO Defence and Security 
Committee Draft General Report.  As hybrid warfare becomes part of common US and 
Western strategic terminology, it is important to understand what the concept 
encompasses and if it is indeed a new way to engage in conflict. It would appear that 
future US defense policy may be influenced based on a concept that does not adequately 
describe current security challenges. 
The use of the term hybrid warfare is becoming more popular within the defense 
community but is not accepted by all. In the view of some commentators, it is not a new 
concept, rather just a buzzword to describe complex conflicts and the use of asymmetric 
capabilities that is common throughout history. In the view of Dr. Damien Van Puyvelde, 
an Assistant Professor of Security Studies and Associate Director of Research at the 
National Security Studies Institute at the University of Texas at El Paso, “warfare, 
whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex and can hardly be 
 3 
subsumed into a single adjective.”2 Colin S. Gray, the director of the Centre for Strategic 
Studies at the University of Reading, warns that creating different categories for 
challenges, wars, strategies, and kinds of warfare are more likely to confuse than 
enlighten.
3
 Divisions between analysts on the applicability of strategic concepts and 
categories can be debated at another time, but the main challenge to the concept comes 
from its similarity to other definitions of conflict.  
US national security policy already recognizes that hybrid wars are a challenge 
and need to be addressed. The 2015 US National Military Strategy highlights hybrid 
conflicts as a distinct security challenge and illustrates the rising acceptance of the hybrid 
war concept. Future US defense policy may be influenced based on a concept that does 
not adequately describe current security challenges. Hoffman claims that recent conflicts 
indicate a blending of various modes of conflict, thus indicating a new type of war that 
challenges current US strategy and understanding of war.  
There are numerous definitions of the hybrid warfare concept and the criterion for 
what constitutes a hybrid war is not universally recognized by academics, governments, 
and military organizations. It is important to recognize and examine how others view 
hybrid warfare and how they differ from one another. This concept is still evolving, and 
there may never be a universally accepted definition. Recognizing common 
characteristics from the various definitions is useful for discussing the differences 
                                                 
 
2Damien Van Puyvelde, “Hybrid war – does it even exist?,” NATO Review, May 7, 2015, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-
ukraine/EN/index.htm.  
 
3
Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion?: The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges 
Either as Irregular or Traditional, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2012),  16.  
 4 
between hybrid war and previously established concepts of war. Some of the previously 
established theories will share similar characteristics with hybrid warfare, but at the 
definitional level, the term does have distinctive features. 
While hybrid war is a new and unique term, its usefulness to US defense 
policymakers may be limited. US defense policymakers have acknowledged that hybrid 
war will be a future challenge, but it will be difficult to create effective policies to 
counter hybrid war when there is not even an agreed definition or criteria for the concept. 
There is a risk of creating a dogmatic concept that does not reflect the realities in future 
conflicts. Instead, the discussions of hybrid warfare illustrate how future wars will likely 
be more complex and require changes in US defense strategies and policy.   
Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, which have been described was hybrid 
wars, provide useful case studies for examining the complexity of conflicts in the post-
9/11 security environment. The case studies illustrate that there is a fundamental 
difference between how current conflicts are fought today from those in the past. At an 
operational and tactical level, government forces in Syria, and separatist fighters in 
Ukraine are utilizing a combination of capabilities and strategies that present a new 
challenge to the US. It is debatable whether or not hybrid warfare is the most effective 
way to describe these threats, but the case studies show that the conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria are more complex than those in the past and represent new challenges for US 
security policy.  
Research for this thesis was conducted using a variety of sources. Due to the 
ongoing nature of the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, most information was gathered from 
secondary media, government, and think tank sources. In both cases, there is a significant 
 5 
amount of propaganda from all sides and certain biases needed to be taken into account 
when conducting research on these conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
HYBRID WARFARE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 There are various definitions of hybrid war, but most appear to be derived from 
Hoffman's works between 2006 and 2016. Hoffman's explanation of the concept is 
widely cited within the academic community and will be used as the base definition for 
this paper. However, Hoffman does not have a monopoly on the concept and other 
academics and government publications offer different views on hybrid war. It is 
important to acknowledge that there is no universally accepted definition of the concept 
and to recognize that there are differences between the various definitions. What 
academics in the United States view as hybrid war may not be the same as how US 
military researchers or analysts in Europe see the concept. Different perspectives need to 
be taken into consideration when analyzing a conflict or policy recommendations to 
avoid confusion. Examining and comparing definitions from European governments, 
think tanks, and analysts to those in the US provides a more complete understanding of 
how others view the concept. 
The Definitions Of Hybrid War 
Hoffman is attributed with forming hybrid war, but other academics also provide 
different definitions for the concept. Retired Colonel John J. McCuen describes hybrid 
wars as 
a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces 
conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets 
while they must simultaneously—and more decisively—attempt to achieve 
 7 
control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing 
them (stability operations).
4
 
 
Like Hoffman, McCuen acknowledges that hybrid wars involve a combination of 
symmetric (or conventional) and asymmetric capabilities. However, McCuen places a 
greater focus on winning over control of the people within the battle space. The battle is 
not just physical, but is “a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s 
indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the 
support of the international community.”5 It appears that McCuen believes that hybrid 
wars require additional focus on winning the psychological battle, not just the physical 
fight. 
From the British perspective, there is a greater emphasis on the proliferation of 
more sophisticated technology to irregular forces on the battlefield. In a white paper on 
irregular warfare, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense notes that “hybrid warfare 
is conducted by irregular forces that have access to the more sophisticated weapons and 
systems normally fielded by regular forces,” and that “intervention forces will need to 
confront a variety of threats that have in the past been associated primarily with the 
regular Armed Forces of states.”6 The British view hybrid war to be more likely used by 
an irregular force that has access to new technologies that counter traditional advantages 
                                                 
4John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (March 2008): 108, 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=31413987&site
=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 3, 2015). 
 
5McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” 108. 
 
6Robert Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not New,” Air & Space Power Journal 23, no. 
4 (Winter 2009): 14, 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=58495364&site
=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 3, 2015). 
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by conventional militaries. Through this perspective, there is less of a chance that a state 
conducts a hybrid war because it already has access to the advanced capabilities.  
Within the US military, there is even a variance in how the concept should be 
defined. According to the 2007 US maritime strategy “conflicts are increasingly 
characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning 
and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in 
innovative ways.”7  Similar to the UK Defense Ministry’s definition, this early US 
strategic view highlights the use of sophisticated technology used by non-state actors in 
conventional and unconventional ways. The key characteristic from both definitions is 
non-state actors have the capabilities of a conventional military but have the ability to use 
them in a variety of different ways. 
One of the most recent US military descriptions of hybrid war comes from the 
2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States. In the 2015 NMS, the US is 
expected to become involved in “hybrid conflicts” comprised of “overlapping state and 
non-state violence… where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve 
their objective.”8 State and non-state actors may work towards shared objectives and 
employ a wide range of weapons.
9
 The use of hybrid conflicts by aggressor states “serve 
to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of 
effective responses.”10 As in previous definitions, there is a focus on regular and irregular 
                                                 
7Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare Something Old, Not New,” 15. 
 
8
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 
Department of Defense (June 2015): 4, 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf. 
 
9
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4. 
 
10
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4. 
 9 
forces cooperating to complete the same objectives and the proliferation of advanced 
capabilities to the unconventional forces. The graphic below further illustrates how the 
US military distinguishes a hybrid conflict from other forms (Figure 1).
11
  
 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of Conflict according to the US Department of Defense
12
  
Figure 1 shows how the Department of Defense defines a hybrid conflict and the 
different military capabilities that may be employed. Compared to the previously 
discussed definitions, the Department of Defense is focused on military operations, and 
does not place an emphasis on the non-military capabilities that are included in other 
definitions. The figure also recognizes that there is a new type of conflict that the US 
                                                 
 
11
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4. 
 
12
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, 4. 
 10 
needs to prepare for, and it has a higher probability of occurring than direct military 
action against another state in the future. Hybrid conflicts also have greater consequence 
than non-state conflicts, indicating that military operations in the future are likely to be 
hybrid and pose a greater risk to national security.   
Hybrid warfare may also be a largely Western construct and influenced by the 
recent and historical experiences of the US and European nations. Dmitry Adamsky, an 
associate professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the 
IDC Herzliya, argues that American, European, and Israeli combat operations in the 
Middle East form the conceptual base and intellectual inspirations for creating the hybrid 
warfare concept.
13
 Adamsky describes “military hybridity as a simultaneous employment 
of conventional, sub-conventional, and possibly non-conventional warfare for the sake of 
political objectives, or as the blurring of political and jihadi identities of the actors.”14 
Unlike any of the other definitions, radical Islam is highlighted as part of the concept. 
Focusing on Islam may be an attempt by the author to expand on their argument that 
recent military conflicts in the Middle East have a disproportionate influence on Western 
thinking.  
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the US and its allies have been 
conducting a global war on terror focused on defeating al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorism 
and as a result, counter-terrorism dominates strategic thinking. US military and 
government officials consistently rank terrorism as the greatest national security threat to 
the country. After years of conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism 
                                                 
13Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” Proliferation Papers no. 54 (November 2015): 22, 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf (accessed December 3, 2015). 
 
14Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” 22. 
 11 
operations targeting terrorist organizations, it is possible that these experiences have 
heavily influenced the hybrid war concept. There is the risk that hybrid war is just a new 
way to explain how radical Islamists conduct war rather than how future conflicts, in 
general, will be fought.      
Another useful framework comes from the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies. In their 2015 edition of “The Military Balance” the publication defines hybrid 
war as  
the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to 
achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical 
advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, 
electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and 
intelligence action; and economic pressure.
15
 
 
 Again, there is the focus on using a variety of capabilities and tactics to achieve 
objectives. What sets this definition apart is the inclusion of gaining a psychological 
advantage and the use of economic pressure. Obtaining psychological advantages and 
using economic pressures have been used throughout the history of warfare, but some of 
the previous definitions have not specifically included them as characteristics of hybrid 
war. 
 Russian military leaders also provide a useful perspective on the future of war that 
matches many of the hybrid war definitions. Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Valery 
Gerasimov, published an article in VPK in February 2013, which outlined his perspective 
on future conflicts.
16
 Gerasimov said that future wars would emphasize “the broad use of 
political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, taken 
                                                 
 
15“Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilities,” The Military Balance 
115:1 (2015): 5.  
16Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 
2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.   
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along with the use of the population's protest potential.”17 His comments are not a 
definition of hybrid warfare, but it shares many of the same characteristics as the 
previous definitions. Gerasimov focuses on the combined use of political, economic, and 
information capabilities with military force.  
Across the spectrum of academic and military analysts, there is a varying degree 
of differences in defining hybrid warfare. Some focus on the use of advanced 
technologies by irregular forces, others on winning the political battle as well as the 
physical. Despite the variation in focus, there are themes that resonate throughout all of 
the previously described definitions. Conventional and unconventional tactics and units 
are used simultaneously to complete an objective or objectives that are political, military, 
or both. There is a blending or blurring between the traditional state and non-state actors 
and capabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
17Leonid Bershidsky, “Moscow Strategists View World as War Theater,” Bloomberg, August 29, 
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-08-29/moscow-strategists-view-world-as-war-theater.  
 13 
HYBRID WAR’S NEW VIEW ON CONFLICT 
 
Common Characteristics Of Hybrid War 
Supporters of hybrid war argue that it is a new type of conflict that is different 
from previously established concepts. The lack of a standard definition of what a hybrid 
war is makes it difficult to compare it to other types of conflict. However, there are 
several common characteristics that are found in most definitions of hybrid war. 
Recognizing these similar themes is useful because it allows hybrid war to be compared 
to the other concepts on war. The following characteristics represent the common themes 
of the various definitions of hybrid war:  
1) Simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional forces at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level;  
2) Use of conventional and asymmetric tactics (including terrorism) and 
operations;  
3) Incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, 
information campaigns, and economic pressure; and  
4) Utilization of all capabilities within a battle space to achieve the objective(s).  
 
While there is a growing acceptance of hybrid war as a legitimate concept to 
describe conflict, it may not necessarily be new to the other views of war. Hybrid war 
shares several key aspects with previously established concepts. Hoffman himself 
acknowledges that hybrid wars are not new and that “the combination of irregular and 
conventional force capabilities, either operationally or tactically integrated, is quite 
challenging, but historically it is not necessarily a unique phenomenon.”18  In order to 
determine if hybrid warfare is indeed a new concept, its definition will be compared to 
other popular views on conflict. 
                                                 
18
Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 1st Quarter, no. 52 
(2009): 36. 
 
 14 
Previously Established Concepts Of War 
There are several concepts on war that share similar definitional themes or aspects 
of hybrid warfare.  They include: total war, low intensity conflict, asymmetric warfare, 
Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and compound warfare. The previously 
listed concepts are not an exhaustive list of concepts of how wars are fought, but each 
one can be related to hybrid warfare. Most of these concepts were established within the 
past few decades to describe US operations outside of the traditional concept of war and 
can be applied to recent military campaigns. However, hybrid war may be the most 
accurate description of current security challenges. 
Total war was one of the first concepts that recognized using a combination of 
economic and military capabilities during wartime to defeat an adversary completely. 
National economics are seen as a critical component of military success and are directly 
linked to the armed forces. According to one commentator, there are “three distinct traits” 
of total war: (1) interdependence between the armed forces and the productive forces of 
the nation, which necessitates large-scale governmental planning; (2) the extension of 
siege warfare enveloping the nation as a whole in both offensive and defensive actions; 
and (3) a general vilification of the enemy nation.
19
 Total war also embraces the use of 
psychological and economic warfare along with the use of traditional military power.
 20 
 
Before the establishment of the total war concept, war was seen as a fight between armed 
forces that did not directly target population centers or the economy. The civilian 
                                                 
19
Hans Spier, “Class Structure and ‘Total War’,” American Sociological Review 4, no. 3 (1939): 
371, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2084924 (accessed December 1, 2015). 
 
20Henry William Spiegel, “Wehrwirtschaft,” The American Economic Review 30, no. 4 (1940): 
713, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805064 (accessed December 1, 2015). 
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population and the economy did suffer during conflict, but the ultimate objective was to 
defeat the opponent’s military on the battlefield rather than the complete destruction of 
their military and economic capabilities. 
Several conflicts in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries have been used as 
examples of total war. The First World War is the most significant example of total war, 
but the American Civil War and the Taiping Rebellion in China have also been described 
as the precursor of World War I.
21
 In his memoirs after the American Civil War, Union 
General William Tecumseh Sherman wrote that there were three tenants to total war: the 
destruction of civilian property and supplies shortened the war by depriving Southern 
armies of material support; depriving the Southern people of their spirit, and dousing 
their enthusiasm for war; and “the idea of collective responsibility, the belief that 
whatever happened, the South deserved it.”22 Sherman targeted any aspect of society that 
would benefit the South and allow them to maintain their military campaign.  
Total war shares some of the same aspects of the hybrid war concept, but 
significant differences remain. Both theories embrace targeting anything that benefits the 
enemy’s capability to fight. National industry and other capabilities that support the war 
effort are legitimate targets. However, unlike in hybrid warfare, there is no mention of the 
use of irregular forces or asymmetric tactics. Within the total war concept, only 
conventional military forces are used during conflict. 
                                                 
21Peter R. Moody, “Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War,” World Politics 31, no. 3 (1979): 
425, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009996 (accessed December 1, 2015). 
 
22Lance Janda, “Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860-1880,” 
The Journal of Military History 29, no. 1 (1995): 16, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944362 (accessed 
December 1, 2015). 
 
 16 
Low intensity conflict shares the irregular and unconventional characteristics with 
hybrid war. In 1988, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff defined low intensity conflict as a 
“political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional 
war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.”23 According to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, low intensity conflicts “are often localized, generally in the third world, 
but contain regional and global security implications.”24 In another description, low-
intensity conflict may involve “urban guerrilla wars, civil wars, separatist movements, 
communal violence, insurrection, coups d'etat, and terrorism.”25 Low intensity conflict 
has limited goals and intentionally avoids escalating to conventional military operations. 
 Hybrid war and low intensity conflict share the characteristics of the use of 
irregular forces or terrorism. In low intensity conflict, there is a greater focus on 
conducting unconventional operations and utilizing non-military capabilities such as 
political, economic, and informational. However, low intensity conflicts differ from 
hybrid war because its purpose is to avoid engaging in a conventional war. Hybrid wars 
blend the conventional and unconventional while low intensity conflicts seek only to 
engage in irregular operations.  
Asymmetric warfare is closely related to low intensity conflicts. In an asymmetric 
conflict, the opponent’s vulnerabilities are specifically targeted and operations “generally 
seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s 
                                                 
23Howard Lee Dixon, “Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions and Policy Concerns,” Army-
Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Langley AFB, VA, 1989), 23.  
 
24Dixon, “Low Intensity Conflict Overview, Definitions and Policy Concerns,” 23.   
 
25Richard H. Shultz, “The Low-Intensity Conflict Environment of the 1990s,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 517 (1991): 121, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1047190 
(accessed December 1, 2015). 
 
 17 
initiative, freedom of action, or will.”26 The conflict will be between a stronger military 
force and one far less capable, skilled or resourced. When one side recognizes that it 
cannot compete at a traditional level, it could “adopt idiosyncratic technologies or 
tactics.”27 In essence, the weaker actor refrains from conducting operations that allow the 
stronger actor to use its capabilities that give it an overwhelming advantage. Instead of 
engaging in set piece battles, one side will determine the weaknesses of the larger power 
and exploit that weakness. 
Low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric war share most of the same basic tenants. 
Both concepts focus on a weaker actor fighting against a traditionally stronger power. In 
an asymmetric conflict, the irregular force will not adopt a regular force structure or 
conduct traditional military operations because it is at a significant disadvantage.  
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) builds on the asymmetric war concept of a 
weaker actor bypassing the strengths of their opponent. According to Jason Vest, a senior 
correspondent for The American Prospect who specializes in intelligence and national 
security issues, the defining characteristics of 4GW are a “vast mismatch between the 
resources and philosophies of the combatants” where operations focus “on bypassing an 
opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political, or population targets.”28 
The main objective in 4GW is to use “all available networks-political, economic, social, 
and military - to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals 
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are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” 29 One side using 
unconventional methods will use a variety of means to make their opponent capitulate to 
political, rather than military, pressure. The main strategic effort may focus on attacking 
more of the civilian base than the actual armed forces of the opponent if perceived as 
more effective. 
There are more similarities between 4GW and hybrid war than there are with 
asymmetric warfare or low intensity conflict. Within the 4GW concept, there is a blurring 
of lines between military and civilian targets and capabilities, with “success depending 
heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission 
become very blurred.
30
 While there still is the focus in 4GW of one combatant having 
superior economic or military power, the concept acknowledges that there will be a 
blurring between what is considered regular or irregular.  
The unrestricted warfare concept comes even closer to the definition of hybrid 
war. First proposed by two Chinese colonels in 1999, unrestricted warfare involves 
“diverse, simultaneous, asymmetric attacks on an adversary's social, economic and 
political systems.” 31  It includes “the employment of all lethal and non-lethal assets, 
including armed and unarmed, military and nonmilitary force to compel the enemy to 
                                                 
29Scott A. Davis, “American Military History and its Insights into Fourth Generation Warfare,” 
(master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 11. 
 
30William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 10 (October 
1989): 23. 
 
31Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: In Ukraine, Russia Reveals Its Mastery of Unrestricted 
Warfare,” World Politics Review (April 16, 2014): 1, 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.missouristate.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=95668504&site
=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 1, 2015). 
 
 19 
accept our interests.”32 Within the unrestricted warfare concept, any and all actions that 
can contribute to victory should at least be considered. In essence, warfare no longer has 
any rules and any part of the adversary’s military or society can be targeted.  
This concept shares more similarities with hybrid war than any of the previous 
concepts. It accepts that during conflict there will be a wide range of capabilities used and 
may include using both conventional and unconventional assets. However, it is also 
incredibly broad because anything and everything could fall under this definition. The 
Chinese authors saw this as the next stage of warfare that will replace current theories on 
conflict. Hoffman and other proponents of hybrid war do not believe that hybrid war will 
replace other theories of war. 
 Compound warfare is perhaps the most similar concept to hybrid war. Thomas 
Huber, a faculty member at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, writes that it is the 
"the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against 
an enemy.”33 Another description of compound warfare is when “separate or 
complementary operations executed by regular and irregular forces are coordinated at the 
strategic level; the simultaneous fight under a unified command and control, in order to 
achieve a common objective.”34 Regular and irregular forces are used at the same time to 
achieve the same goal. A single command and control center coordinates the efforts of 
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both forces and gains the advantages of both conventional and unconventional 
capabilities.   
While compound warfare appears to be the same as hybrid war, there is a key 
difference at the operational and tactical levels. In both concepts, the simultaneous use of 
regular and irregular forces to complete a common objective is a defining feature. 
However, in compound warfare, the coordination is limited to the strategic level. 
Irregular units are used to support the conventional forces but in different areas of the 
battle space rather than combining with them. Hybrid warfare features the fusion of 
conventional and unconventional forces within the battle space. 
 
Nature Of Past Conflicts Compared To Hybrid War 
The previously discussed concepts of war do share similarities with the criteria of 
hybrid war, but none share all four main characteristics. Table 1 illustrates the key 
similarities and differences between the previously examined concepts of war to the 
common characteristics of hybrid war. Each concept shares one or two key characteristics 
but lacks other critical components, making hybrid warfare a unique and different type of 
conflict. The four characteristics below were established for this thesis to highlight the 
main components of the hybrid war concept. 
1) Simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional forces at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level 
2) Use of conventional and asymmetric tactics (including terrorism) and 
operations 
3) Incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, 
information campaigns, and economic pressure\ 
4) Utilization of all capabilities within a battle space to achieve the objective(s) 
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Table 1. Comparing other concepts of war to the four characteristics of hybrid war 
Concept Key Similarities to Hybrid 
War 
Key Differences to Hybrid 
War 
 
Total War 
 
Targeting economic 
infrastructure 
Using economic 
capabilities 
 
Limited use of asymmetric 
tactics or unconventional 
forces 
 
 
 
Low Intensity Conflict 
 
 
Use of unconventional 
forces and asymmetric 
tactics 
Use of information 
warfare and propaganda 
 
 
Little focus on combining 
regular and irregular 
forces 
No use of conventional 
tactics, limited goals 
 
 
Asymmetric Warfare 
 
 
Use of terrorism, 
unconventional forces and 
tactics 
Information warfare is 
critical 
 
 
No use of conventional 
forces or tactics 
No use of economic 
capabilities 
 
 
Fourth Generation Warfare 
(4GW) 
 
 
Combination of political, 
economic, and military 
capabilities 
Use of conventional and 
unconventional tactics 
 
 
Focused on striking 
civilian and economic 
targets 
Conventional and irregular 
forces not completely 
integrated 
 
Unrestricted Warfare 
 
Combination of military, 
political, and economic 
capabilities 
Use of conventional and 
asymmetric tactics 
 
Extremely broad and not 
limited to a battlespace 
Believed to replace all 
other types of war in the 
future 
 
 
Compound Warfare 
 
 
Simultaneous use of 
regular and irregular 
forces 
Unified command and 
control 
 
 
Conventional and 
unconventional forces do 
not combine on the battle 
space 
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Each concept shares some of the key criteria for hybrid war, but fail to include all 
four criteria. Total war and hybrid warfare both use economic and conventional 
capabilities, but total war only uses limited asymmetric forces and tactics. Low intensity 
conflicts place importance on asymmetric capabilities and the non-military measures like 
information and propaganda campaigns, which are key criteria for hybrid warfare. 
However, low intensity conflict intentionally avoids using conventional capabilities that 
are required in hybrid wars. Asymmetric warfare, like low intensity conflict, focuses on 
using irregular units but also lacks the use of conventional forces and tactics. 
 Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and compound warfare appear 
to have the most similarities to hybrid warfare. The combination of political, economic, 
and military capabilities along with the use of conventional and unconventional forces are 
all aspects of Fourth Generation Warfare, unrestricted warfare, and hybrid warfare. 
Unrestricted warfare is incredibly broad and does not meet the criteria of all of the 
capabilities being used in a single battle space. Fourth Generation Warfare, and 
compound warfare, both fail to meet the hybrid warfare criteria of combining 
conventional and unconventional forces within the battle space. 
The hybrid warfare concept is not expected to become the only way actors will 
wage war in the future. It will not replace asymmetric, compound, or low intensity 
aspects in conflict situations, but it may be a more effective way to analyze current 
conflicts. US policy is starting to acknowledge the hybrid war concept but has yet to 
apply it to a conflict.  
 23 
The lack of a standard definition is one of the main challenges facing the 
development of the hybrid warfare concept. There are competing perspectives on what 
hybrid war is within the US and among Western allies, which can make cooperation 
between governments more difficult if there are contrasting viewpoints. It is unlikely that 
a universally accepted definition of hybrid war will be accepted by the US and its allies, 
but establishing general criteria for what constitutes hybrid war would help provide the 
framework for future security policies. If Western policymakers and militaries cannot 
agree on the criteria for hybrid war, there is a risk of each country developing security 
policies that do not fully address the current security challenges. 
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THE COMPLEX CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND UKRAINE 
 
This section of the thesis argues that the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine are 
different than past military operations and attempt to illustrate the complexity within the 
battlespace. Military operations in both Syria and Ukraine share many of the 
characteristics with the hybrid war concept. Regular forces are usually combined with 
irregular units during major operations and a variety of conventional and unconventional 
tactics are employed in the battlespace. Neither conflict fully falls within the hybrid war 
concept, but both case studies provide examples of how modern military operations are 
becoming more complex.    
 
The Rise Of Conflict In Syria And Ukraine  
The ongoing conflict in Syria has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and 
destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure. There are numerous internal and external 
actors that are either directly or indirectly involved in the fighting. Conventional and 
irregular forces are fighting each other as well as terrorist organizations in a complex 
environment. Within both the Syrian regime and opposition forces, there are multiple 
motives for fighting along with conflicting objectives, adding further complications to 
grasping a complete understanding of the conflict. 
Syria’s current violence grew out of pro-democracy protests that were met with a 
violent response by President Bashir al-Assad. Protests started in the southern city of 
Deraa after teenagers were arrested and tortured for painting revolutionary slogans on a 
 25 
school wall.
35 
By July 2011, hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets 
demanding Assad resign.
36
 The regime responded with increasing force against 
demonstrators, causing opposition supporters “to take up arms, first to defend themselves 
and later to expel security forces from their local areas.”37 According to the UN, by 
August 2015 over 250,000 people have been killed due to the fighting.
38
 What started out 
as political protests evolved into a multinational conflict that continues to draw in new 
actors. 
In a broad sense, there are three main groups of actors involved in military 
campaigns in Syria, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), militias loyal the regime, and 
international allies who provide support to Assad’s regime. Outside of the SAA, Assad’s 
forces are augmented by Shia fighters from Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Russian 
regular forces.
39
 Iran and Russia have also provided Assad with political and military 
support since the protests started in 2011.
40
 As the conflict has progressed, the regime has 
had to increase its dependency on direct support from its international allies. 
The rise of Ukraine’s separatist forces in the eastern part of the country in 2014 
also provides a useful case study for this discussion because it is frequently called a 
hybrid conflict by the West. Russian soldiers are reportedly fighting directly with the 
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separatists, and entire Russian regular military units are also believed to be operating in 
the country. On August 28, 2014, NATO released a series of satellite images that showed 
Russian combat troops inside Ukraine.
41
 Despite numerous investigations and claims by 
the West, Moscow categorically denies it has deployed Russian soldiers into eastern 
Ukraine. 
These conflicting claims present a challenge to analyzing the conflict. Moscow 
and Kyiv are conducting significant information operations to send different messages to 
the international community. Both sides are accusing the other of being the aggressor and 
have a bias in their reporting. Like all conflict, the fighting is extremely emotional, and 
some sources are designed only to present certain perspectives. Despite these challenges, 
the conflict in Ukraine is important to analyze because it is already becoming the 
embodiment of hybrid war.  
Unlike the Syrian civil war, which typically focuses on military action, the 
fighting in Ukraine provides a useful example of the incorporation of non-military tools, 
such as electronic or cyber operations, information campaigns, and economic pressure, in 
a modern conflict. Political instability throughout the country provides Russia with the 
ability to put internal and external political pressure on Kyiv. The conflict in eastern 
Ukraine grew out of a political revolution that started in 2013 known as the Maidan. 
Massive protests against the pro-Russian government in Kyiv and other major cities 
caused the president to flee the country.  
During the political turmoil, Russia annexed the Crimea Peninsula, which likely 
became the model for pro-Russian separatist movements in Ukraine. On April 7, 2014, 
                                                 
41“NATO releases satellite imagery showing Russian combat troops inside Ukraine,” NATO, 
August 28, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_112202.htm.  
 27 
protesters seized strategic buildings in the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv.
 42
  
Protesters were unable to hold Kharkiv, but unrecognized referendums held in Donetsk 
and Luhansk (also known as the Donbas) on May 11 voted for independence.
 43
  That 
same day, separatist leaders declared the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic 
(DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). 44  However, unlike in Crimea, the 
Kremlin did not welcome the DNR and LNR with open arms. Instead of moving to annex 
the self-declared republics, Moscow called for caution and negotiations.
 45
  
The hesitation by the Kremlin to accept the DRN and LNR into the Russian 
Federation allowed Kyiv to organize itself politically and militarily. Presidential elections 
held on May 25 in most of the country, except in the Donbas area, resulted in Petro 
Poroshenko becoming the next president of the country
46
, who ordered the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine to begin offensive operations against the separatists in June 2014.
47
 Referred 
to as Anti-Terrorist Operations (ATO), Ukrainian forces quickly recovered larger cities in 
the Donbas, including Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, and begin to encircle the city of 
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Donetsk.
 48
 On June 25, the Russian Duma (Parliament) canceled its previous resolution 
authorizing the use of Russian forces in Ukraine.
 49
   
ATO forces continued their advance until mid-August 2014 when the situation on 
the ground changed significantly. By August 19, the DRN and LNR lost three-fourths of 
their originally claimed territory, until the introduction of substantial Russian military 
equipment and regular forces.
 50
 According to a study conducted by the Atlantic Council, 
an estimated 4,000 regular Russian soldiers crossed the border with tanks and quickly 
halted the ATO advances.
 51
 Separatist forces, now bolstered by Russian troops, forced 
the Ukrainian troops to retreat until a ceasefire was reached in Minsk, Belarus on 
September 5, 2014.
 52
 ATO forces may have been able to break the separatist leaders’ will 
before the middle of August, but after the deployment of Russian soldiers, the DNR and 
LRN solidified their positions.  
The ceasefire, known as the Minsk Agreement, was not to last. In many areas, 
such as around the Donetsk Airport, fighting did not slow down.
53
 The conflict would 
escalate until February 2015 when another ceasefire brokered by France and Germany 
was signed once again in Minsk.
54
 Under the Minsk II agreement, separatists gained 
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control of an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and assurances by 
Kyiv that political steps would be taken to recognize the DNR and LNR.
55
 As of this 
writing, the Minsk II agreement is still in effect but the political aspects have yet to be 
implemented, and separatist territory has not significantly expanded. 
 
The Fusion Of Regular And Irregular Forces 
One of the main characteristics of hybrid war, as well as the fighting in Syria and 
Ukraine, is the combination of regular and irregular forces in military operations. In 
Syria, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is the conventional, state military controlled by the 
Assad regime. At the start of the conflict, the SAA was the regime’s primary security 
force, but as the opposition gain more territory and control, it needed to be augmented 
with locally organized militias, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, and 
Iranian and Russian forces. All of these different organizations work together, creating a 
multifaceted force that can conduct a variety of operations and utilize the benefits of 
conventional and unconventional tactics. 
Irregulars Supporting Conventional SAA And Russian Forces. On paper, the 
SAA at the beginning of the civil war was one of the most impressive militaries in the 
Arab world. In 2011, the army had an estimated non-reserve strength of 220,000 
soldiers.
56
 Many of the top commanders were trained by Soviet advisories and most units 
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use Soviet-era equipment.
57
 However, once the protests evolved into open conflict, large 
numbers of soldiers defected and the regime could not depend on the loyalty of 
significant portions of the army. According to various sources, both from the opposition 
and Western think tanks, an estimated 65,000 to 75,000 out of the 220,000 soldiers 
remain loyal and dependable to the regime.
58
 Other estimates in 2014 put SAA numbers 
at around 150,000, almost half of its pre-war strength.
59
 Mass desertions significantly 
affected the regime’s ability to hold and defend territory from the opposition and the 
Islamic State. After losing almost half of its manpower, and unable to trust some of the 
soldiers that remain, the regime turned to irregular forces from both internal and external 
sources.  
 The National Defense Forces (NDF) were originally created as neighborhood 
militias to protect the regime and maintain the status quo in Syria and their specific 
towns. While the militias support Assad, they also have their local interests that may 
contradict the strategy of the government.
60
 These groups operate in a similar manner as 
the Popular Committee militias in Iraq and are located throughout most of Syria.
61
  
Volunteers continue to join the NDF and form a significant irregular capability for 
Assad. Recent estimates put the NDF at a total strength between 60,000 to 100,000 
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fighters.
62
 The regime started formalizing and professionalizing the militias in 2013, 
when it created the NDF, to fully utilize their capabilities.
63
 Once integrated into the 
government’s defense structure, the NDF started to receive better weapons and training 
from the Syrian military.
64
 Before the formalization of relations between the regime and 
the militias, it is believed that Iran and Hezbollah provided training and equipment for 
many of the groups.
65
 Many of the NDF units started out as proxies for Iran in its effort to 
prevent Assad from being overthrown.
66
 As a result, the training the militias received 
focused on asymmetrical, urban, and guerrilla warfare, types of war that the SAA was 
unprepared to fight.
67
 The NDF provides additional forces for the regime that are 
dependable, adequately trained, and are prepare to fight in a similar manner as the 
opposition. 
 Iran is also suspected of being deeply involved in not only training local 
paramilitaries but providing the regime with its forces and foreign fighters. Like the 
NDF, these irregular units augment the SAA throughout the country and provided 
additional reserves for offensive operations. Iranian soldiers also provide training and 
intelligence for the regime. It appears that Iran is becoming more involved in military 
operations in Syria and their support for Assad shows no sign of dropping off. 
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 Most of the Iranian influence in Syria comes from the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps- Quds Force (IRGC-QF). The US first acknowledged that the IRGC-QF 
was actively training paramilitaries in Syria in August 2012 and were forming a militia 
called the Jaysh al-Sha‘bi.68 It is unknown how many IRGC-QF commanders are 
operating in Syria, but the numbers range from 60 to 70 to "a few hundred".
69
 However, 
it is known that the leader of the IRGC-QF, Qassem Suleimani, is in Syria and most 
likely leading operations there.
70
  
Open-source information does not provide many details into the complete extent 
of the IRGC-QF involvement in Syria, but Iranian forces are now participating in direct 
combat operations. Since 2013, there have been "157 IRGC members killed in combat in 
Syria, including Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani (the most senior IRGC commander 
killed in Syria), General Hamid Mokhtarband (head of an armored brigade combat team) 
and his chief of staff Farshad Hassounizadeh.”71 If recent estimates put Iranian advisors 
at most “around a few hundred”, then the IRGC has suffered heavy casualties in recent 
years while fighting in Syria. Regardless of the number of commanders, the IRGC-QF 
has deployed to the region; it is important to recognize that Iran is directly involved in the 
military operations. 
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 Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon further support regime forces and plays a 
similar role as Iran in Syria, providing advisors and leaders for militias and irregular 
forces throughout eastern Syria. Its involvement in the civil war has evolved and 
expanded with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and pressure on the regime. Hezbollah 
deployments remain near the Lebanese border and the western areas of Syria.  
 Unlike the IRGC, Hezbollah’s involvement started out as both a training and 
combat mission. Its forces operate alongside both Iranian and NDF troops, providing key 
leadership capabilities for pro-regime militias.
72
 The first major deployment of militants 
occurred on June 12, 2014, two days after the fall of Mosul to IS.
73
 According to a 2014 
assessment by Israeli military officials, around 4,000 to 5,000 Hezbollah fighters are sent 
to Damascus, Qalamoun, Homs, Latakia, Aleppo, and southern Syria on a rotational 
basis.
74
 Hezbollah is largely limited to regions along or near the Lebanese border but 
does participate in regular combat operations. 
  Similarly, to Iran, Hezbollah's role in the conflict has increased over the years. 
Currently, there is an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 fighters deployed to Syria, at least 1,000 
more than in 2014.
75
 In the past two years, Hezbollah has created two new commands, 
one on the Lebanon-Syrian border and another within Syria.
76
 According to one analyst, 
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by 2015 Hezbollah was suffering 60 to 80 casualties a week in just the Qalamoun 
region.
77
 Hezbollah’s increasing number of troop deployments and casualty rate indicates 
that the group is dedicated to the fight in Syria and intends to maintain its presence within 
the country. Assad’s regime can continue to depend on Hezbollah for support in its 
military operations throughout western Syria. The NDF, IRGC, and Hezbollah all provide 
regime forces with additional unconventional soldiers for a variety of operations.  
 Russia's current involvement in Syria has been in direct air support for the SAA 
and irregular forces throughout the country. The air campaign began on September 30, 
2015, and according to the US State Department, "90 percent of Russian airstrikes 
targeted Syrian rebel positions rather than ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra during the first 
week.”78 Russian planes mainly fly out of the Bassel al-Assad International Airport near 
the port city of Latakia, with some helicopter gunships operating out of bases in Hama, 
Sharyat, and Tiyas.
79
 Overall, the Russian forces contain up to 34 combat aircraft 
including advanced jets and attack helicopters.
80
  
 Recent troop movements in Homs may indicate that Russia plans to expand its 
presence in Syria. According to a local human rights organization, the Russians are 
“building new runways at the Shaayrat airport and reinforcing its surroundings in order to 
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use it soon for operations."
81
 A local media source reported that the Shaayrat airbase has 
around 45 fortified airplane hangars and two runways.
82
 If these claims are true, Moscow 
may be planning to send additional aircraft or shift already deployed assets to the 
Shaayrat airbase. New deployments will provide regime forces in central Syria more 
effective air capabilities for future operations. It also illustrates Russia’s resolve in the 
conflict and its willingness to commit significant forces to the fight in Syria. 
 Ukraine’s Irregular Separatists And Covert Russian Support. In Syria, the 
SAA is overtly supported by the NDF, IRQC, Hezbollah, and Russia. Ukrainian 
separatists operate within a more covert environment. In eastern Ukraine, the separatists 
are largely an irregular force that grew out of anti-Maidan sentiments and the desire to 
remain politically close to Moscow. It was only after the ATO started making significant 
gains against the DNR and LNR that Russia covertly deployed regular forces into the 
region. The governments in Damascus and Kyiv both have to fight irregular opponents, 
however, in Ukraine the separatists are directly augmented with foreign regular forces 
rather than the government. 
 Since their formation, the separatists have benefited from having access to 
Ukrainian and Russian military equipment. Open source investigations have shown that 
over time Russia has sent more sophisticated and advanced weapon systems into the 
Donbas.
83
 Ukrainian airpower was quickly negated due to the effective use of man-
portable, shoulder-fired air defense systems (MANPADS), and advanced radar-guided 
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surface-to-air missiles.
84
 Separatists are also equipped with Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), 
specifically T-72s and T-64s, along with multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), such as 
the BM-21 “Grad”.85 Along with access to assorted small arms and support weapons, 
separatist forces either match Ukrainian military capabilities or at times, surpass them. 
Not only do the DNR and LNR have a general parity in military capability with 
Ukrainian forces, but they also have similar overall force strengths. According to 
estimates from Kyiv, there are approximately 36,000 Russian and separatist fighters in 
the Donbas, compared to the 34,000 Ukrainian soldiers along the line of contact.
86
 The 
separatist numerical advantage alone makes it incredibly difficult for Kyiv to launch 
successful offensive operations against entrenched and hardened separatist positions.  
 The DNR claims to have consolidated its forces under the control of its Ministry 
of Defense and are coordinated through its unified command. Various militia groups are 
now all working together as the Army of the DNR, rather than armed gang only 
subordinate to their leader. Most of the independent militias now operate as the 1
st
 Army 
Corps, under the Department of Defense of the Donetsk People’s Republic.87 The 1st 
Army Corps originally formed out of several of the major independent units such as the 
Slavyansk Brigade, Oplot, Kalmius, and others.
88
 In September 2015, parts of the 
Republic Guard, another conglomerate of smaller groups, also joined the 1
st
 Army 
                                                 
 
84Pifer, et al. “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression,” 8.  
 
85James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, & Michael Weiss, “An Invasion by Any 
Other Name: The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine,” Institute of Modern Russia, 2015, 14.  
 
86Pifer, et al. “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression,” 12.  
 
87Alexander Fedotov, “On the Reorganization of the Army of the DPR,” Slavyangrad.org, 
September 25, 2015, https://slavyangrad.org/2015/09/25/on-the-reorganisation-of-the-army-of-the-dpr/.  
 
88Fedotov, “On the Reorganization of the Army of the DPR.”  
 37 
Corps.
89
 Over time, the DNR has tried to force all of the militias to at least appear to fight 
under one banner, rather than as a group of allied, but independent units. 
 One of the most famous units in the DNR forces, and possibly the most effective, 
is the Sparta Battalion. The group, led by Arsney Pavlov (who goes by the nom de guerre 
Motorola), has reportedly fought in some of the fiercest battles throughout the conflict.
90
 
An estimated 150-200 men fight in the unit.
91
 Its fighters took part in the operations at 
Ilovaisk
92
 and the Donetsk Airport.
93
 Sparta Battalion is an infantry unit and is meant to 
operate in a conventional capacity.  
 Another conventional, and heavily armed, DNR battalion is believed to be from 
Chechnya. The Vostok (East) Battalion arrived in May 2014 and established their 
headquarters in Donetsk.
94
 Fighters in the Vostok Battalion come from Chechnya, South 
and North Ossetia, and Russia.
95
 It is also particularly well-armed, having been seen with 
surface-to-air missiles, 30mm automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and 
anti-tank weapons separatist leaders claim they took from a Ukrainian military base.
96
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The amount of foreign fighters within the unit, and its advanced weaponry makes it more 
unique among the separatist forces. 
 Many of the pro-Russian militias are designed to be conventional infantry units. 
However, some of the groups also have mechanized capabilities. One such unit is the 
Oplot (which means “stronghold” in Russian) Battalion, commanded by Aleksandr 
Zakharchenko, the current prime minister of the self-declared DNR.
97
 The group is 
equipped with several Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which may have come from Russia.
98
 
Oplot Battalion also has Grad MLRS deployed around the city of Donetsk.
99
 Unlike the 
infantry-based Sparta Battalion, Oplot is more of an armored unit that supports other 
separatist groups.  
 Volunteer units in the DNR are also significantly diverse in the number of fighters 
who join them. Some groups have between 1500 and 300 fighters, but others can number 
in the thousands. The Russian Orthodox Army, led by former Russian intelligence officer 
Igor Strelkov (real last name Girkin), is believed to have up to 4,000 members.
100
 It has 
participated in operations around the Donetsk Airport and may have shot down a 
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Ukrainian military helicopter.
101
 According to members of the unit, around 20 percent of 
the fighters are Russian, and the other 80 percent are local volunteers.
102
 It is an infantry 
unit and is not known to have significant armored or artillery capabilities.  
 Some of the volunteer groups in the LNR have joined to form larger and more 
formal military units. One of the first units to combine smaller separatist militias under 
one name is the Army of the South-East, or South-East Army, which formed in Luhansk 
on April 6, 2014.
103
 Originally led by Alexey Mozgrovi, it has several thousand members 
from around a dozen smaller battalions.
104
 In December 2014, the unit was renamed the 
Corps of the People’s Militia under the command of Major-General Sergei Ignatov.105 
Creating the Corps of the People’s Militia is an attempt by the separatist government in 
Luhansk to bring the militias under a more unified command, similarly to the DNR’s 1st 
Army Corps.The Zarya (“Dawn”) artillery brigade, which was created and led by current 
LNR president Igor Plotnytski, joined the official LNR military structure after its 
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creation.
106
 One of the oldest and most well-equipped militias, the Dawn Brigade has 
around 1,000 men.
107
  
 Ukrainian forces not only have to fight against the irregular volunteer separatist 
forces but also against professional, conventional Russian military forces equipped with 
superior weaponry and capabilities. Many of these units are sent to bases near Russia’s 
border with Ukraine then cross over the border.
108
 A variety of Russian soldiers are 
believed to be operating with the separatists, including special forces of both the GRU 
(Russian military intelligence) and the Federal Security Service (FSB, the successor to 
the KGB).
109
  
Moscow denies any direct military involvement in Donetsk or Luhansk oblast. 
The Kremlin also claims that it has not provided advanced military equipment to 
separatist forces in the Donbas. Both NATO and independent analysts have challenged 
Russia’s denials of its direct involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine.110 In 
response to the accusations from the West, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has 
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challenged Kyiv to present facts that Russia is sending military equipment to the 
separatists, and said that “before demanding from us that we stop doing something, 
please present proof that we have done it."
111
 Moscow can counter these allegations 
because the forces it has deployed across the border often operate without insignia. 
Since the summer of 2014, Russia has redeployed various troop formation to the 
Ukrainian border. Some of the units include the “20th, 58th and 41st Armies, and the 
76th VDV (Airborne) Division, which participated in Georgia in 2008.”112 In March 
2015, US Army Europe Commander Ben Hodges estimated that twelve thousand Russian 
soldiers, including “military advisers, weapons operators, and combat troops” are active 
in eastern Ukraine.
113
 NATO estimates from January 2015 place between 250 to 1000 
GRU officers in eastern Ukraine that advise and assist separatist forces as well as operate 
sophisticated weapons systems.
114
 
The introduction of advanced MBTs from Russia, either operated by pro-Russian 
or regular Russian soldiers, have had a significant impact on the fighting. According to 
Aleksandr Zakharchenko, the leader of the DNR, Russian reinforcements in August 2014 
including “150 units of combat armor, including about 30 tanks -  the rest were AIFVs 
(Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and APCs… were inserted here at the most critical 
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moment."
115
 Throughout the conflict, armored forces provided by Moscow have been 
critical in major victories against the ATO forces. Despite the importance of these forces, 
the Kremlin continues to deny they are operating in the Donbas. 
  
Joint Regular And Irregular Operations In Syria And Ukraine 
Hybrid war involves not just regular and irregular soldiers fighting the same 
enemy. What separates hybrid war from other concepts is when all of these different 
capabilities are coordinating their operations to achieve the same objective, in the same 
battle space. This creates an environment where it is impossible to independently target 
the irregular from the regular forces during combat. The joint forces in Syria and Ukraine 
previously described have conducted numerous significant operations that illustrate this 
complexity in modern conflict. 
In Syria, almost all major regime operations involve the SAA operating with at 
least one other irregular force that has been previously described. These combined forces 
operate across all of the regime’s fronts. In October 2015, a senior Iraqi politician 
announced that a joint information center between Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran was 
established in Iraq.
116
  Another joint operations room was reportedly established in 
Damascus following talks in Moscow.
117
 Regions in the north, particularly in Latakia, 
Aleppo, and Idlib provinces provide the best examples of joint operations. One video 
posted online showed the leader of the IRGC-QF Qassem Suleimani addressing Iranian 
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military officers and Hezbollah fighters in Latakia.
118
 During a television interview on 
September 22, 2016, IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi said that during 
operations, Russia provides the aerial support for the ground units, which Safavi 
describes as “the Syrian army, Syrian popular forces, and some advisory forces and/or 
Hezbollah forces.”119 Safavi also said that the on-the-ground intelligence collection for 
the airstrikes is conducted by units under the supervision of IRGC or Hezbollah 
operatives.
120
  
 A major offensive in Aleppo Province provides an example of the conventional 
SAA conducting a joint operation with the irregular IRGC. On October 15, 2015, the 
regime launched an offensive to strengthen its foothold in Aleppo city.
121
 SAA forces, 
with Iranian proxy fighters, ended the multiyear siege of the Kuweires Airbase east of 
Aleppo City.
122
 At the same time, additional SAA units supported by both Russian 
airstrikes and “2,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a militia fighters" assaulted 
opposition-controlled villages south of Aleppo City.
123
 According to opposition forces, 
Russian personnel also participated in the attack and “directly supervised the operation 
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via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room.”124 The October 2015 Aleppo offensive is an 
example of a conventional force (the SAA) augmented by irregular forces (IRGC, 
Hezbollah) conducting an assault supported by a third additional actor (Russian aircraft) 
within the same battle space. 
 A similar offense occurred in Idlib Province in October 2015. During an offensive 
in early October, two Hezbollah commanders were reportedly killed fighting with regime 
forces near Idlib.
125
 The assault started on October 11, 2015, when regime forces 
supported by Hezbollah fighters and Russian air power, attempted to cut off the 
opposition in Idlib.
126
 The fact that two Hezbollah commanders died in the fighting 
indicates that the group is directly involved combat and is not taking an ancillary role. 
Operations conducted by pro-regime forces in the southern provinces of 
Qalamoun and Derra are similar to those in northern and central Syria. Hezbollah 
fighters, along with Iranian proxies and regime forces, began to retake strategic ground 
throughout the mountain range in Qalamoun in 2013.
127
 By March 2014, Syrian forces 
reported that they had taken the last opposition stronghold in the Qalamoun Mountains at 
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Yabroud.
128
 After losing territory to the opposition in early 2015, the regime and 
Hezbollah reported regaining “control of 300 square kilometers in the region” in May 
2015.
129
 All three operations involved a combination of the SAA and Hezbollah 
coordinating their efforts to retake and control territory throughout Qalamoun but did not 
involve asymmetric tactics. 
  In Deraa Province, Assad's forces work directly with Iranian soldiers and 
Hezbollah. An offensive launched on February 3, 2015, in northwestern Derra was 
reportedly preceded by IRGC and Hezbollah activity in the region, including sleeper-cell 
operations.
130
 On February 10
th, “approximately 5,000 Syrian soldiers, Hezbollah 
fighters, and Iranian militiamen seized several towns and hills in northern Dera’a 
Province, including Deir al-Adas and Deir al-Makir, following the launch of a regime 
offensive on February 9.”131  The Syrian Defense Minister and IRGC-QR commander 
Qassem Suleimani reportedly visited the frontlines during the operation.
132
 Suleimani’s 
presence suggests a high level of command and control coordination between Syrian and 
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Iranian leaders to launch a successful joint offensive that captured territory from the 
opposition. 
 Separatist offensives in Ukraine, backed by Russian forces, also provide useful 
examples of joint operations. The Ukrainian defeat at Ilovaisk in 2014 marks the turning 
point of the initial conflict and the first significant use of regular Russian soldiers in the 
Donbas. Prior to the battle at Ilovaisk in Donetsk oblast, the separatist forces were being 
pushed back and rapidly losing ground to the ATO.
133
 Fighting in Ilovaisk started on 
August 18 when Ukrainian soldiers started an operation to seize the town to cut a rail line 
to Russia and separate the DNR and LNR stronghold.
134
 ATO soldiers occupied half the 
town while conducting fierce close-quarters combat with separatists in the town.
135
 The 
regular Ukrainian soldiers were bolstered with the volunteer Dnipro and Donbas 
battalions but were not able to evict the separatist forces from Ilovaisk. 
136
 
 In less than a week, the ATO forces faced total encirclement and annihilation. 
Starting on August 23, separatist artillery and rockets from Grad MLRS started to land 
around the ATO positions.
137
 On August 29, ATO forces started to withdraw after 
believing that they had secured safe passage through a corridor out of the town, but where 
attacked as they left the area. 
138
  The massive losses at Ilovaisk shocked Kyiv. An 
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official study conducted by the military prosecutors announced the official death toll at 
366.
139
 It took President Poroshenko four days to acknowledge the defeat publicly. 
140
 
DNR soldiers in the town and the surrounding area, most likely backed by Russian 
regulars, were able to stop the ATO advance into the town and start to envelop their 
flanks. During the fighting in Ilovaisk, the Ukrainian forces captured a T-72 before 
retreating from the town, just one example of Russian tanks being deployed to support 
separatist operations.
141
 The separatists formed a cauldron, a Soviet-era term for a full 
encirclement, around the Ukrainian soldiers and then destroyed them as they attempted to 
leave the cauldron.
142
  
Throughout most of the conflict, major Ukrainian defeats occurred when the 
separatists were able to isolate and encircle the ATO forces. The offensive against 
Ukrainian soldiers in Debaltseve also involved pro-Russian forces forming a cauldron 
around the ATO position, backed by Russian armor.
143
 Separatist forces slowly started to 
push towards Debaltseve in early January 2015. The town of Debaltseve sits on a 
strategic railway hub that connects Donetsk to Luhansk and Russia.
144
 Starting in late 
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January 2015, pro-Russian armored units started engaging Ukrainian forces outside the 
town.
145
 On January 23-24, separatists seized the villages of Troitskoye and Svtlodarsk, 
located near the M-103 highway that connects Debaltseve to the Ukrainian stronghold at 
Artemivsk.
146
 Initial maneuvers by the pro-Russian forces intended to isolate and 
eventually surround the ATO soldiers in Debaltseve and force a surrender.  
The unique location of Debaltseve allowed the DNR and LNR to launch a 
significant combined operation to capture the city. Initial attempts to move on the village 
from the southwest in Donetsk oblast by the DNR did not achieve significant results.
147
 
To the east, LNR units started to make progress and on February 10, the village of 
Logvinovo, also located along the M103 highway and northeast of Debaltseve, fell to 
separatists.
148
 By February 10, the Ukrainian forces were effectively caught in another 
cauldron. The M103 highway, the most effective means of escape or resupply, was 
threatened on both sides. 
Ukrainian forces tried to hold out as long as possible but decided to withdraw 
instead of losing thousands of troops in the town. The order to retreat came days after the 
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signing of the Minsk II ceasefire on February 14, 2015.
149
 On February 18, ATO forces 
started to retreat from Debaltseve, and similarly to Ilovaisk; separatist forces opened fired 
on the convoys with artillery and tanks.
150
 Using effective combined arms of infantry, 
artillery, and tanks, the DNR and LNR units conducted a joint encirclement operation and 
delivered a crushing blow to Kyiv. Separatist fighters admitted after the Battle of 
Debaltseve that Russian tanks had been decisive in winning the fight.
151
 According to 
Kyiv, 66 Ukrainian soldiers were killed and 300 hundred wounded while DNR claimed 
that the Ukrainians suffered over 3,000 killed during the battle.
152
 It is likely that both 
sides altered the numbers to support their narrative, but it is sufficient to say that the ATO 
suffered significant casualties and an embarrassing retreat. 
At both Ilovaisk and Debaltseve, DNR and LNR forces were able to overpower 
and outmaneuver the ATO. These successes are largely due to the support provided by 
Russian forces operating alongside the separatists. According to Aleksandr 
Zakharchenko, the leader of the DNR, Russian reinforcements in August 2014 including 
“150 units of combat armor, including about 30 tanks -  the rest were AIFVs (Armored 
Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and APCs… were inserted here at the most critical 
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moment."
153
 The introduction of regular Russian armored unit halted the ATO advance 
and allowed the encirclement of Ilovaisk. Russian tanks at Debaltseve provided the same 
advantage for the separatists, all while Moscow denied any direct involvement in the 
fighting.  
 
Asymmetric Tactics Used By The Syrian Regime And Ukrainian Separatists 
Supporters of the hybrid war concept argue that another unique characteristic of 
the concept is the use of both conventional and asymmetric tactics and operations by the 
joint forces. Asymmetric tactics range from using irregular forces to infiltrate cities to 
terrorist operations. The Syrian regime utilizes the capabilities of its irregular forces to 
mount a variety of asymmetric operations against the opposition, including infiltrations, 
kidnappings, and the use of barrel bombs. Separatists in Ukraine have launched a number 
of bombing campaigns in major cities controlled by the government, and Russia is 
suspected of being behind significant electronic warfare operations. These asymmetric 
capabilities are sometimes used in support of major operations or to generally weaken the 
resolve of the opponent. 
Fighting around al-Qusayr, Homs province, provides a useful example of regime 
forces using asymmetric tactics. In April 2013, a coordinated effort between the SAA and 
Hezbollah forced the opposition into al-Qusayr and isolated them in the city.
154
 Regime 
forces combined with Hezbollah fighters and the NDF assault al-Qusayr in early May 
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2013, supported by regime artillery and air support.
155
 During the attack, the irregular 
forces infiltrated the city before armored-supported units moved in to secure it.
156
 The 
capture of al-Qusayr involved Hezbollah fighters launching the main assault while being 
directly supported by SAA artillery and airstrikes.
157
 NDF and Hezbollah units were able 
to launch a successful, asymmetric infiltration mission into the city to help neutralize 
defensive positions before SAA armored units conducted the conventional main assault. 
A joint offensive in Quenitra Province in March 2015 also involved irregular 
operations. Regime forces along with IRGC and Shia militias “launched a violent attack 
on all towns and villages in the northern countryside of Daraa, the countryside of 
Quneitra and the liberated villages in the western countryside of Damascus.”158 Part of 
the attack involved heavy rocket, artillery, and air strikes along with the use of barrel 
bombs.
159
 In mid-October “the Syrian army, Hezbollah reinforcements, and local militias 
loyal to the regime” held back an opposition offensive, with Hezbollah reportedly 
contributing over 500 fighters to the defense.
160
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The fighting in Quneitra illustrates the ability of the regime to use combined 
regular and irregular forces and the use of conventional and asymmetric operations or 
tactics. Regular SAA units combined with the irregular IRGC and Hezbollah forces to 
conducted offensive and defensive operations. During those operations, the combined 
pro-regime forces used conventional tactics along with the asymmetrical tactical use of 
barrel bombs. 
After losing much of the countryside in northern Syria in 2013, pro-regime 
militias allegedly “kidnapped hundreds of civilians from rebel-controlled villages around 
Idlib city.”161 Kidnapping civilians allow the regime to disrupt opposition plans without 
having to devote forces to the battlefield. According to the UN Human Rights Council in 
2014, “government forces continued to perpetrate massacres and conduct widespread 
attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced 
disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity.”162 In the same report, it is noted 
that "indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling led to mass 
civilian casualties and spread terror.”163 The SAA and regime allies have used terrorism 
as a deliberate tactic in an attempt to force the civilian population to support the 
government and to combat the opposition. 
 Assad’s regime has also used chemical weapons against both civilian and 
opposition targets throughout the country. One Human Rights Watch report notes that 
“Syrian government forces used toxic chemicals in several barrel bomb attacks in Idlib 
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governorate between March 16 and 31, 2015.”164 Human Rights Watch investigated a 
sarin gas attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013, and determined that the 
evidence strongly suggested that the Syrian government conducted the attack.
165
  The 
deadliest attack occurred on August 21, 2013, in Ghouta, when in a single chemical 
attack more than 5,000 people were affected and around 1,500 were killed.
166
 While the 
use of chemical weapons against civilians or in a conflict is not a new phenomenon in 
war, it illustrates the regime’s deliberate use of asymmetric capabilities to further their 
military objectives in the civil war. 
 Throughout the conflict, the regime has depended on air power to protect itself 
and to strike opposition positions. Barrel bombs have become a standard tool in the 
regime arsenal to cut costs and expand the use of its air fleet.
167
 Essentially, barrel bombs 
are barrels filled with explosives dropped from planes or helicopters. They are highly 
imprecise and are indiscriminately used by the regime in areas with high population 
density where opposition fighters are.
168
 Government forces consistently and 
“systematically target civilians and civilian infrastructure, demonstrating the intent to kill, 
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wound and maim.”169 The use of barrel bombs and heavy bombardments are intended to 
soften opposition military positions as well as spread terror amongst the population. In 
theory, either the civilians will leave the area or turn against the opposition to stop the 
attacks. Either way, Assad gains more control and weakens the opposition by using 
terrorist tactics. 
Unlike the fighting in Syria, which features several instances of asymmetric 
operations at the tactical and operational level, asymmetrical tactics are used at the 
strategic level in Ukraine. Independent partisan organizations attack Ukrainian 
infrastructure outside of the Donbas, but with the ultimate objective of destabilizing the 
government in Kyiv. Russian special forces deployed to Crimea to secure key buildings 
but operated in a more asymmetric than conventional manner. 
There are two main sabotage groups that operate outside of the territory controlled 
by the DNR and the LNR, one in the city of Kharkiv and another around the city of 
Odesa. Both groups have launched bombing campaigns that largely target infrastructure 
and buildings, but rarely people. Out of the two groups, the most vocal and active is the 
one operating in Kharkiv. The Kharkiv Partisans, as they call themselves, have been 
active since the fall of 2014. 
170
 According to media reports, the partisans are responsible 
for over 40 bombings that have resulted in at least five deaths.
171
 In February 2015, the 
group claimed responsibility for detonating a mine during a parade celebrating the 
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anniversary of the Maidan that killed four people and the bombing of a local battalion 
commander’s car that wounded the man and his wife. 172 Ukrainian security services 
believe that the group is equipped and controlled by Russian special forces operating out 
of Belgorod, Russia. 
173
 It is difficult to determine if the Kharkiv Partisans are indeed 
under orders from the Russian military. However, their activities do target pro-Kyiv 
organizations and ATO supporters. 
 The overall goal of the organization is to “liberate” the people of Kharkiv. In an 
interview with Time, Filipp Ekozyants, a former wedding singer and spokesman for the 
partisans, stated that the bombings in the city are conducted to weaken the authorities and 
inspire residents to join the separatist movement. 
174
 The targets of the bombings are 
mainly military and industrial installations in the city of Kharkiv and the surrounding 
region.
175
 Ekozyants claims that his organization is part of the same network as the 
separatists in Donetsk, and they are fighting for the same cause.
176
 His statement is 
interesting because it implies that the DNR leadership is ordering the bombings. Whether 
or not this is true, there is a reasonable chance that the Kharkiv Partisans are at least in 
contact with the DNR and share the same eventual objective of reuniting Ukraine with 
Russia.  
                                                 
 
172
 “In the Fold,” The Economist, April 11, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21648033-ukraines-second-city-shows-no-risk-rebelling-it-far-
secure-fold. 
 
173
 Maxim Tucker, “Russia Launches Next Deadly Phrase of Hybrid War on Ukraine,” Newsweek, 
March 31, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/10/russia-launches-next-deadly-phase-hybrid-war-
ukraine-318218.html. 
 
174Simon Shuster, “Meet the Pro-Russian ‘Partisans’ Waging a Bombing Campaign in Ukraine,” 
Time, April 10, 2015, http://time.com/3768762/pro-russian-partisans-ukraine/. 
 
175Shuster, “Meet the Pro-Russian ‘Partisans’ Waging a Bombing Campaign in Ukraine.”  
 
176
 Shuster, “Meet the Pro-Russian ‘Partisans’ Waging a Bombing Campaign in Ukraine.”  
 56 
 A group similar to the Kharkiv Partisans is believed to be operating in and around 
the city of Odesa. Unlike in Kharkiv, there is no spokesman or video claims of 
responsibility for bombings in the city. Between July 2014 and January 2015, there were 
nine bombings, with seven taking place in December.
177
 Many of the attacks target the 
offices of pro-Ukrainian organizations or volunteer battalion and typically occur at night 
to avoid causing casualties.
178
 Other attacks have targeted railway lines and fuel 
tankers.
179
 Ukrainian security officials claim that bombings are carried out by pro-
Russian saboteurs to destabilize the country.
180
  The targets and modus operandi of the 
incidents in Odesa share similar characteristics to those in Kharkiv. Both groups attempt 
to avoid casualties and specifically target pro-Kyiv organizations or infrastructure. 
 Regular Russian soldiers have also conducted asymmetric operations in the 
region. When unidentified gunmen appeared in Crimea in February 2014, Moscow 
denied they were Russian soldiers. President Putin argued that the equipment carried by 
the gunmen could be bought in a military surplus store.
181
 The men appeared to be 
regular Russian soldiers without insignia and quickly received the nickname ‘little green 
men’ by the Ukrainian military due to the color of their uniforms.182 A year after the 
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annexation of Crimea, Putin admitted to ordering military forces into Crimea to returning 
the peninsula to Russia in late February after Yanukovych fled the country.
183
 Within 
days, Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) units deployed to Russia’s Black Sea Naval Base 
in Sevastopol. 
184
 This admission directly conflicts with the initial statements by Putin 
and the Kremlin following the referendum in Crimea.  
 Putin justified the deployment of soldiers to Crimea as a peacekeeping measure 
rather than an invasion. According to Putin, the armed forces were sent to Crimea to 
block Ukrainian soldiers stationed there “not for the purpose of forcing people to 
participate in the vote… but to prevent bloodshed, and to allow people to express their 
personal views on how they would like to see their own and their children’s future.”185 
The soldiers deployed to Crimea were also visibly well-armed, which deterred Ukrainian 
forces from moving against them.
186
 Sending heavily armed, but unidentified gunmen, 
allowed Moscow to prevent the Ukrainian military from countering the pro-Russian 
sections of the population. By the time the referendum was held, the peninsula was 
largely under the control of Russian and pro-Russian fighters. At the time, Moscow was 
able to deny direct involvement plausibly because the special forces soldiers lacked any 
identifiable insignia. 
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Creating Economic And Political Pressure To Support Military Operations 
The incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, 
information campaigns, and economic pressure is another characteristic of hybrid war. 
Assad’s regime’s two main tools for exerting economic and political pressure on the 
opposition are sieges and ceasefires. Sieges allow the government to target the economic 
capabilities and public support centers of the opposition. Ceasefires provide the regime 
with the ability to increase international pressure on opposition forces. The separatists in 
Ukraine also benefit from internationally organized ceasefires, as well as advanced 
electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Political dynamics between Moscow and Kyiv 
place additional stress on the Ukrainian government as it fights in the Donbas. 
Sieges are a critical part of the regime’s campaign to put economic and political 
pressure on the opposition. Within the context of the Syrian conflict, a siege is defined as 
“when armed forces cut off access to a populated area, blocking the entry of food and 
medicine and preventing the free movement of civilians into or out of the area, including 
the evacuation of people in need of urgent medical care.”187 The regime is attempting to 
reduce the opposition’s ability to fight by preventing necessary aid and food from being 
sent into the suburbs. This fits within the third criteria of hybrid war, the use of non-
military capabilities like economic and political pressure. Extended sieges may reduce 
popular support for the opposition in these areas and force the opposition to come to 
terms for aid to be delivered to the suburbs. 
According to PAX and the Syria Institute, two international organizations that 
closely monitor and report on the besieged areas, there were more than one million 
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Syrians in siege locations in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Deir Ezzor, and Idlib 
provinces as of May 2016.
188
 Another 1.4 million people live in areas that are at risk of 
becoming completely besieged by regime forces.
189
 One of the most recent sieges 
occurred on July 7, 2016, Assad’s forces took critical ground outside the city of Aleppo, 
and effectively besieged the opposition within Aleppo.
190
 Throughout the civil war, 
regime forces have encircled enemy positions to prevent aid from entering opposition 
strongholds and cutting any economic prospects to the cities.  
International peace talks and ceasefires also provide the government with the 
ability to put political pressure on opposition leaders. In 2016, the SAA announced a 
unilateral ceasefire to celebrate Eid el-Fitr, the end of Ramadan.
191
 However, 
international observers noted that regime forces continued to attack opposition positions. 
In the last day of the alleged ceasefire, at least 50 people were killed by air strikes and 
artillery bombardments.
192
 Assad can deny that his military is breaking the ceasefire, and 
use any instances when the opposition fights back as an example of them not attempting 
to work with the government to find a diplomatic solution. 
Unlike the Syrian civil war, which typically focuses on military action, the 
incorporation of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, information 
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campaigns, and economic pressure, is a critical component of the fighting in Ukraine. 
Political instability throughout the country provides Russia with the ability to put internal 
and external political pressure on Kyiv. Ceasefires brokered by the international 
community appear to benefit the separatists more than the ATO forces, and allows 
Moscow to directly influence the politics in the Donbas. 
The first ceasefire was called after the dynamics of the fighting in eastern Ukraine 
significantly changed. In August 2014, ATO forces were rapidly advancing in separatist 
territory, and by August 19, the DRN and LNR lost three-fourths of their originally 
claimed territory, until the introduction of substantial Russian military equipment and 
regular forces.
193
 An estimated 4,000 regular Russian soldiers crossed the border with 
tanks and quickly halted the ATO advances. 
194
 Separatist forces, now bolstered by 
Russian troops, forced the Ukrainian troops to retreat until a ceasefire was reached in 
Minsk, Belarus on September 5, 2014.
195
 ATO forces may have been able to break the 
separatist leaders’ will before the middle of August, but after the deployment of Russian 
soldiers, the DNR and LRN solidified their positions.  
Known as the Minsk Agreement, this ceasefire was not to last. In many areas, 
such as around the Donetsk Airport, fighting did not slow down.
196
 The conflict would 
escalate until February 2015 when another ceasefire brokered by France and Germany 
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was signed once again in Minsk.
197
 Under the Minsk II agreement, separatists gained 
control of an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and assurances by 
Kyiv that political steps would be taken to recognize the DNR and LNR.
198
 As of this 
writing, the Minsk II agreement is still in effect but the political aspects have yet to be 
implemented, and separatist territory has not significantly expanded.  
Political pressure is put on Kyiv at the same time that Russian and separatist 
forces are launching offensive operations in the Donbas. The first Minsk Agreement was 
supposed to stop the fighting and allow discussions between Kyiv and the DNR and LNR 
to take place. Instead, separatist offensive maneuvers increased, and Ukraine forces lost 
ground while the ceasefire was supposed to be implemented. Separatist and Russian 
forces seized even more territory during negotiations for the second Minsk Agreement. 
Minsk II came into effect on February 15, 2015, but three days later separatist forces 
seized Debaltseve.
199
 The ceasefires and political pressure prevented Kyiv from using its 
full military capability to stop the offensive because the government did not want to 
appear to be the first side to break the ceasefire. 
Throughout the conflict in the Donbas, Ukrainian forces have noted significant 
electronic warfare and cyber operations against its forces and the country’s infrastructure. 
Electronic operations targeting Ukrainian military forces have occurred since the 
annexation of Crimea. Once Russian forces started arriving in Crimea, Ukrainian soldiers 
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reported being unable to use their radios and phones for hours at a time.
200
 Russian 
electronic capabilities regularly block radar and GPS signals and disrupt command-and-
control networks.
201
 These jamming capabilities reduce the Ukrainian forces’ ability to 
launch effective counter-battery artillery fire and communicate during operations. 
Electronic warfare capabilities usually support separatist assaults and provide an 
additional advantage over the Ukrainian military. 
Critical infrastructure within Ukraine has also been the target of cyber-attacks 
during the conflict. The most significant event took place in the Ivano-Frankivsk region 
in Western Ukraine on December 23, 2015.
202
 Unidentified hackers took control of the 
power grid computer system and shut down 30 substations, cutting power to more than 
230,000 residents in the middle of a cold winter.
203
 Ukrainian intelligence services 
blamed Russia for the attack, but it remains unclear who is responsible for the incident.
204
 
Regardless, the cyber operations are clearly anti-Kyiv and seek to further destabilize the 
government while they are fighting the separatists. 
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Complex, Not Hybrid, Conflicts In Syria And Ukraine 
The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have both been called hybrid wars, neither 
fully fits within the established definitions of the concept. At times, there are some 
regime operations in Syria that meet many of the qualifications for hybrid war, but 
ultimately fail. Ukraine has few instances that meet the characteristics of the concept. 
However, what these case studies do illustrate is the complexity of the conflicts and the 
new challenges that they present.  
Fighting in Damascus provides the best examples of the multifaceted operations 
in Syria. Regular and unconventional forces all operate together, using conventional and 
asymmetric tactics, to fight the opposition around the capital. Economic pressure is 
applied to opposition-controlled areas through the use of sieges. All of these capabilities 
are used around Damascus with the ultimate objective of regaining control of the suburbs 
around the capital. 
 In the Damascus suburbs, the regime creates pressure on opposition forces by 
launching “including highly destructive artillery bombardments and air raids.”205 Former 
opposition fighters have switched allegiances to Assad, such as Jaysh al-Wafa (Loyalist 
Army), created via the government’s “Reconciliation Committees.”206 Jaysh al-Wafa uses 
insurgent and terrorist tactics when attacking opposition forces in Damascus and Eastern 
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Ghouta.
207
 Instead of overextending the SAA forces tasked with protecting Assad, the 
regime uses the militias to launch strikes against the opposition. 
 The fighting in Eastern Ghouta and Jobar demonstrates the regime’s ability to use 
a variety of conventional and asymmetric capabilities within the same battle space. In 
Eastern Ghouta, “the regime has also conducted a systematic effort to neutralize other 
opposition-held neighborhoods through sieges, starvation,” and the use of chemical 
weapons.
208
  Jobar is targeted by SAA heavy artillery, airstrikes, and ballistic missile 
attacks on a daily basis, and “both sides have used ‘tunnel bomb’ attacks to burrow 
explosives underneath opposing strongholds.”209 In many neighborhoods, the fighting is a 
mix of indiscriminate bombing, urban warfare, and terrorist attacks conducted by the 
SAA and its irregular allies.  
Separatist operations in Eastern Ukraine include many of the characteristics of 
hybrid war, but not all aspects are involved in every operation. The major engagements at 
Ilovaisk and Debaltseve provide the best examples of hybrid war. At Debaltseve, the 
irregular separatist forces were supported by conventional Russian armored units
210
 and 
advanced electronic warfare capabilities
211
, to defeat the Ukrainian forces. However, 
separatist operations in the Donbas do not feature many asymmetric tactics. This is a 
critical component of hybrid warfare that is missing in many of the separatist operations. 
Partisan groups in Kharkiv and Odesa provide the ability for separatists to launch 
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asymmetric attacks, but so far they have not been in support of major operations in the 
Donbas. While the separatists have not used many asymmetric tactics, they maintain 
asymmetric capabilities that can be used in the future.  
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PREPARING FOR FUTURE COMPLEX CONFLICTS 
 
A New Type Of War 
Military strategists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have viewed war as taking place 
on a linear battlefield; hybrid war does not follow this prescription. There are numerous 
factors that influence war and can provide advantages, but in the end, war was generally 
seen as one armed force fighting another armed force. The type of an armed force can 
range from a terrorist organization to a nation’s military, but the conflict itself is linear in 
nature. 
 Hybrid warfare is more complex than using just an armed force to attack another 
armed force. Irregular forces provide new ways to exploit the weaknesses of a 
conventional force. Political, economic, and cyber capabilities provide non-military tools 
allow one side to put additional pressures on an opponent. All of these different abilities 
are applied at the same time, within the same battle space. Hybrid war allows the 
advantages of each capability to be used while countering those enjoyed by the enemy. 
Once the US military started to dominate the post-Cold War world, it is likely that 
potential adversaries understood that it would be difficult and costly to take on the 
American forces in a linear, conventional fight. Hybrid warfare is one way in which US 
advantages can be countered and negated.   
 However, the usefulness of the concept to the policymaker is arguably limited. 
There is still considerable debate among analysts, academics, and officials over what a 
hybrid war even is. Hybrid war is conceptually new, but hybrid conflicts involve many of 
the same issues that US policymakers and strategists have been facing throughout history. 
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Even if a standard definition is established, it is unlikely that future conflicts will fit 
within the established parameters.  
 The real usefulness of the hybrid war is how discussions of the concept have 
illustrated the growing complexity of modern and future conflicts. Fighting in Syria and 
Ukraine shows that the line between conventional and unconventional forces and 
operations are becoming increasingly blurred. Future opponents are likely going to use a 
number of political, economic, and cyber capabilities that the US has not had to face in 
previous conflicts.  
        
Lessons From The Wars In Syria And Ukraine 
The Syrian and Ukrainian case studies provide examples of how war is becoming 
more complex and the challenges that the US may experience in future conflicts. Each 
conflict is unique and highlights how different capabilities can be used in new ways on 
the battlefield. Integrated regular and irregular forces are being deployed into the same 
battle space that use a variety of conventional and unconventional tactics. 
Simultaneously, political and economic pressure is being applied overtly and covertly to 
reduce the opponent’s ability counter the military forces on the ground. New cyber and 
electronic warfare capabilities also provide a new tool that adds more complexity to the 
conflict.  
 Both conflicts illustrate combined forces being used at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical level. The Syrian Army has integrated irregular forces on all of its fronts, and 
almost all operations use combined forces. Russian and separatist forces in Ukraine are 
more focused on fighting together at the tactical and operational level than the strategic. 
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The partisan groups provide the asymmetric capabilities, but they are not used outside of 
the strategic level.   
 Fighting in Syria has unique characteristics that are different from what is seen in 
Ukraine. In Syria, the conventional and irregular forces operate overtly and only make 
limited attempts to hide information. Russia and Iran do attempt to limit how much 
information is available regarding their troop deployments and how involved their 
soldiers are, but neither country denies involvement in the war. Hezbollah, a US-
designated terrorist organization, openly fights alongside regime forces throughout the 
country. The regime regularly launches conventional and asymmetric operations with the 
SAA combined with irregular forces. 
 Pro-regime forces illustrated in Damascus, al-Qusayr, and Quneitra that combined 
forces using different tactics, including terrorist attacks, can operate effectively. The use 
of terrorism during military operations may occur in future conflicts and only makes the 
battlefield more complex. Hybrid war requires military forces to have the resources to 
effectively defend against several different types of conflict, all at the same time. In 
future conflicts, US forces may have to be able to conduct conventional and counter-
terrorist operations at the same to counter a hybrid threat. 
 The fighting in Ukraine is an example of complex conflict that emphasizes covert 
conventional forces and capabilities. Unlike in Syria, Russia categorically denies any 
direct military involvement in the Donbas. Moscow insists that it has not deployed any 
regular forces across the border and that the separatists are operating on their own. This 
ambiguity limits how much support the US can provide to the government in Kyiv 
because Russia can continue to provide covert support without the US being able to 
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respond in kind. Ukrainian forces have to fight against irregular separatists backed by 
Russian armored units and advanced military capabilities. Major separatist victories all 
occurred with significant support from the regular, conventional Russian military. US 
forces in the future may become engaged in a similar situation where the main 
conventional enemy is working with irregular forces, but covertly, and an escalation of 
force may not be possible without potentially starting an even larger conflict.   
Electronic warfare is becoming more advanced and can significantly reduce 
technological advantages in future wars. Jamming technology in Ukraine shut down 
military communication networks and prevented effective counter-battery fire during 
separatist maneuvers. The US military relies on digital communications and has not faced 
an enemy in recent conflicts with effective electronic warfare capabilities. In the future, 
this may not be the case, and the US and its allies need to be prepared to fight in an 
environment with limited or no digital communications. 
Cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure may also occur in the future. The 
attack in Ukraine that shut down the power grid did not occur at the tactical level in 
Donbas, but at the strategic level, and proves that infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber 
operations. Future hybrid operations may include a cyber-attack that shuts down critical 
systems before, or during, an attack at the tactical and operational levels. Cyber-attacks 
could be like the one in Ukraine, where power is cut to a large segment of the population, 
causing the government to divert resources and time to fixing the damage from where the 
main hybrid operation is.  
Ukraine’s cyber-attack also illustrates how difficult it is to attribute responsibility 
for cyber operations. It is possible that Russia was behind the attack, and it would make 
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sense given the current situation in the Donbas, but so far the perpetrator(s) of the attack 
have yet to be identified. During a hybrid war, cyber-attacks could target the US without 
Washington being able to respond because the attacker is unable to be identified. 
The Syrian and Ukraine case studies both show complex the security environment 
is in modern conflicts. Fighting in these increasingly tangled conflicts requires the ability 
to counter conventional and asymmetrical capabilities at the same time in the same battle 
space. However, military operations are only one facet of war. Controlling information at 
the local and international level is a critical component of complex conflicts. Recent 
counter-insurgency experiences in the Middle East have illustrated how important it is for 
the military to gain the trust of the people by countering the propaganda of insurgents and 
terrorist groups. Adversaries will try to control the narrative of the conflict, and the US 
needs to be able to counter an opponent's propaganda campaign effectively. If the US and 
its allies fail to conduct information operations, they risk losing international credibility 
and the support of the local population. 
Extensive economic capabilities are not used throughout the Syrian and Ukrainian 
case studies but are another potential challenges in the future. The regime in Syria uses 
sieges to stifle the local economies in the Damascus suburbs, but it is a relatively limited 
campaign. These sieges affect the opposition at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels by limiting their ability to sustain their units in the area and could reduce local 
support. Future wars could involve extensive attacks on the economic base of the US or 
its allies. Economic pressure might come in the form of trade blockades or other acts, like 
a cyber-attack on financial infrastructure. Isolated economic attacks are a real risk, but if 
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conducted at the same time during a military operation, it would create additional stress 
for the government and the armed forces.  
 
Countering US Advantages With Multiple Capabilities 
The US has had to face many of the same challenges that are high lightened in 
Syria and Ukraine throughout history. What separates potential future conflicts from the 
past is the combination of all of these threats occurring at the same time. The growing 
complexity creates a significantly more challenging security environment that will 
require extensive resources and flexibility to counter each threat effectively. Many of the 
current US advantages are at risk in this type of battle space, and US military forces will 
need to be able to adapt should it lose advantages in technology and conventional 
capabilities. 
In the current post-Cold War security environment, the US has enjoyed a 
significant advantage in technology and information systems over any adversary, but 
utilizing diverse and complex strategies allows an opponent to counter those advantages 
and exploit their weaknesses. Few countries can achieve parity with the American 
military’s advanced weapon systems, technical capabilities, and extensive resources. 
However, the current US military superiority may not be the most effective at countering 
complex threats.  
US forces are focusing on organizing, equipping, and planning for future conflicts 
based on advanced air systems, digital information systems, and reduced ground forces. 
Hybrid war allows an enemy to use conventional forces and tactics to counter US 
technical advantages. Electronic warfare can disrupt or disable the extensive information 
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and space-based systems that US technology depend on to effectively operate. Command, 
control, and communication capabilities all need digital networks, and future enemies can 
target the networks to negate those advantages. 
Conventional US military forces have been able to dominate the tactical 
battlefield in recent conflicts. However, as US land forces are reduced, they may become 
less effective in the new complex environment. Opponents are likely to employ forces 
that formed from integrated regular and irregular soldiers, allowing them more options to 
meet various conditions on the battlefield. Fewer ground units limit how much territory 
can be physically held, which is essential when fighting insurgencies or groups 
conducting terrorist attacks, tactics that are likely to be used during in future wars. US 
land forces need to be able to deploy against the enemy’s conventional and irregular units 
at the same time. 
The American conventional military dominance has also limited the exposure of 
US soldiers to experiences such as drone strikes, massed artillery fire, and massed tank 
formations. In future conflicts, it is likely that the enemy will possess advanced 
unmanned platforms that can launch precision-guided munitions or provide intelligence, 
reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities. At least within the past decade, US forces 
have not fought an opponent that can field large tank formations supported by artillery 
and aircraft. American units have not had to face comparative advanced conventional 
capabilities on the battlefield for some time and lack the firsthand experience of being 
under massed indirect fire or being targeted by precision munitions. 
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Fighting In A Complex Environment 
In future conflicts, there is a possibility that the US will face an opponent that 
utilizes complex or hybrid operations. US military officials, as previously discussed at the 
beginning of this thesis, have acknowledged that there is an increasing probability the US 
will be involved in a hybrid conflict. Certain actions can be taken by policymakers to 
prepare American forces to fight in a complex security environment.   
 Winning The Information War. The current US technical abilities, based on 
space and information systems, provides the American military with unparalleled 
advanced capabilities. However, if those systems are disabled or disrupted, US forces 
need to be prepared to fight without access to the weapons and communications that run 
on the space-based platform. In a hybrid war, the enemy will likely be able to reduce at 
least some of the advanced capabilities using electronic warfare or cyber-attacks.  
 Maintaining extensive IRS capabilities will assist US forces in identifying the 
different components of each criterion of hybrid war. It is critical to understand the 
conventional and irregular forces of the enemy, what their capabilities are, and how they 
will operate. Some enemies may focus more on conventional units while others may use 
more irregular forces and asymmetric tactics. Understanding how the opponent plans to 
fight is critical in hybrid war so the appropriate US forces can be deployed to counter 
each threat. 
 Special operational forces (SOF) with experience fighting in complex 
environments can provide critical IRS capabilities. In a report released by West Point’s 
Modern War Institute, Captain John Chambers argues that US SOF are “essential in 
providing understanding of the human terrain” and are “able to engage early, understand 
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what is happening, and identify options to shape, deter, and influence actors in the gray 
zone.”212 SOF units were effectively deployed to northern Afghanistan to work with the 
Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban and to northern Iraq in 2003 to coordinate with the 
Kurds. Chambers notes that the Special Operations Command is already working on re-
establishing units that focus specifically on unconventional warfare and have been 
operating in anti-IS operations in Syria.
213
 Maintaining SOF units that are trained to 
operate in complex environments rather than just in a counter terrorism or stability 
capacity will provide useful options of the US in the future. 
 The US can also utilize current defensive alliances such as NATO to improve its 
intelligence gathering operations. Intelligence sharing among NATO members exists, but 
current mechanisms do not provide quick and efficient exchanges of domestic 
intelligence. A general report released by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2015 
highlighted the challenges in information sharing and called for creating “a point of 
access to each member state’s domestic intelligence agencies.”214 The report also called 
for increasing cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence organizations which 
will “allow member states to better address a range of transnational security threats and 
shared issues.”215 Creating regional intelligence sharing centers throughout NATO states 
could improve intelligence capabilities and cooperation.
216
  
                                                 
212John Chambers, “Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats,” The Modern War Institute at West 
Point (October 18, 2016): 32, http://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Countering-Gray-Zone-
Hybrid-Threats.pdf.  
 
213Chambers, “Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats,” 32. 
214Julio Miranda Calha, “Hybrid Warfare: NATO’s New Strategic Challenge?,” (NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly General Report, Brussles, Belgium, 2015), 9.   
 
215Calha, “Hybrid Warfare: NATO’s New Strategic Challenge?,” 9. 
 
216
Ibid., 9.  
 75 
Ambiguous operations are one of the most significant challenges in the complex 
environment, such as the Russian deployments into Ukraine. Having an efficient and 
connected network of local sources across Europe could provide a type of warning 
system that alerts NATO to possible political or social situations that are conducive to 
manipulation from outside sources. If a conflict has already begun, the intelligence 
sharing centers could deliver the information necessary to counter covert support or 
operations. However, this system would likely only be effective in NATO spheres of 
influence. Complex environments are to be expected throughout the world, not just in 
Europe. Policymakers could consider increasing intelligence cooperation with allies 
outside of NATO. 
The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have also demonstrated the importance of 
strategic communications and information dissemination. Russian media portrays the 
separatist conflict as an oppressed section of Ukrainian society being unjustly attacked by 
the government. Kyiv is typically labeled as fascist or neo-Nazi and local grievances are 
specifically targeted by the media. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of 
Excellence noted in 2016 report that social media was being used to “create confusion 
about the events in Ukraine” and “diminish the value of the truth.”217 Social media and 
other information services can be used to disrupt messaging and spread alternative 
narratives that limit options for the US. 
Developing and maintaining effective strategic communications capabilities 
would be useful in countering the opponent’s narrative and propaganda. NATO has 
created the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia to improve 
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information operations, but according to the Parliamentary Assembly reports, it does not 
fully coordinate strategic communications across the “Alliance, regional, and individual 
member state level.”218 Similar to the intelligence network, focusing on improving 
coordinate between all member states could strengthen the entire alliance and provide a 
more effective counter to the adversary’s messaging. 
 Creating Flexible Forces And Utilizing Alliances. The conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria have shown that states are able to deploy various types of units and operate in 
different ways, from a conventional offensive to terrorist attacks. Extensive ground forces 
are necessary to be able to meet any enemy formation that is used in a future conflict. 
Each future conflict will be unique and require a flexible force to counter a variety of 
threats. Reducing the number of ground forces hinders the ability of the US military to 
adapt and be effective in a complex environment. 
 US forces need to be able to quickly deploy into a variety of environments and be 
capable of engaging conventional and irregular forces. This is not a new challenge for the 
US military or its allies, and forward deploying units has historically been the solution. 
Forward deployments remain a useful tool and could reduce escalation in potential 
conflict zones. Chambers argues that that pre-positioning forces in at risk countries 
increases the risk for a potential aggressor to become directly engaged with US forces 
and reduces ambiguity.
219
 During the Cold War, the US had static bases in Western 
Europe as a deterrent and to provide a force that could be quickly deployed. The rising 
tensions with Russia have convinced Eastern European allies to allow US forces to 
rotationally deploy into their country. Norway announced on October 24, 2016 that it 
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would allow US troops to be stationed at the Vaernes military base throughout 2017, and 
potentially into the future.
220
 
 Similar rotational deployments can be used by the US in the future to bolster 
allies and partners that are at risk to incursions. These forward deployed forces can train 
and work together with the host nation to better understand the security environment and 
conditions on the ground. Even if the US troops fail to deter an adversary from becoming 
more aggressive or conducting operations, they can be in a position to quickly react and 
adapt to the situation. 
 However, the US will not always be able to station forces in all situations. 
Forward deployments are expensive and cost restraints can limit resources or the political 
environment in the potential host country prevents direct deployments. Once a country is 
designated as at risk of becoming involved in a complex environment, the military could 
create an advance campaign already staffed and approved by the necessary authorities in 
both the US and the host country that can be quickly put into action.
221
 Advance planning 
would reduce the amount of time it takes for the US to mobilize its forces and provide a 
clear outline of what the US forces will do once they are deployed. Confusion and 
ambiguity are significant challenges in the complex environment and pre-planned 
campaign could reduce some of the uncertainty. 
 It will not always be clear when a country is at risk of becoming involved in a 
conflict and advancing planning may not always be in place. Creating units that are 
specifically trained and equipped to be rapidly deployed into a complex environment 
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would provide policymakers with the ability to quickly react to unexpected conflicts. 
Following the Russian involvement in Ukraine, NATO created the Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF), which “will shorten the time necessary to bring significant 
firepower to any corner of the Alliance to deter and defend any member state.”222 One of 
the shortcomings of the VJTF is that it is only focused on military operations. The US 
should continue to invest in the VJTF and could create its own independent versions that 
are prepared to deploy into regions outside of NATO. If able, the US could create 
different regional joint task forces with partners and allies in Africa, Asia, and the 
Americas based on the VJTF.  
Rapid reaction forces in a complex environment need to be capable of countering 
not just the adversary’s military capabilities, but their political, economic, and 
informational capacity as well. This will require improving and building cooperation 
between the various government offices outside of the Department of Defense, including 
the State Department, the Intelligence Community, and other necessary departments. The 
State Department can integrate civil affairs officers into the force to provide political 
support and advice. Chambers offers a similar solution if soldiers are able to be forward 
deployed into a host country.
223
 Complex conflicts require more than just military forces, 
and US troops need the support of non-military capabilities. 
 The US is likely to be engaged in a complex conflict in the future, and the 
military should prepare to fight in an environment without its current technological 
advantages. Not all conflicts in the future will by complex, but the trends in Syria and 
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Ukraine suggest that hybrid operations are effective and can counter America’s 
conventional dominance. Failing to prepare for this type of security environment 
increases the risk that the US will be unable to effectively counter new security threats 
and challenges in the future.     
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